Written by Ruzbeh Hosseini, a Toronto litigation lawyer and partner at Cambridge LLP
Last reviewed: September 2026
This article is provided for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. It is not a substitute for advice on the facts of a particular matter, and no solicitor-client relationship is created by reading it. The Court of Appeal made no findings on the truth of any allegation discussed.
The public interest threshold turns on what the expression is about, not how many people heard it. Rajic v. MacDonald, 2026 ONCA 288.
In this Ontario anti-SLAPP defamation case, Rajic v. MacDonald confirms that a private complaint can relate to a matter of public interest even when it is shared only with a small institutional audience. At the threshold stage under s. 137.1, the focus is on what the expression is about, not simply how widely it was distributed.
A great deal of reputational conflict never reaches the public at all. It takes the form of a complaint to an employer, a regulator, a board, or—as in this case—a church. When the subject of that complaint sues for defamation, can the person who complained use Ontario’s anti-SLAPP provisions to have the action dismissed early, even though the complaint went only to a handful of officials?
In Rajic v. MacDonald, released April 21, 2026, the Court of Appeal for Ontario said yes, that route is open. A complaint made privately to the people responsible for an institution can relate to a matter of public interest. The size of the audience is not the test.[1]
How an Anti-SLAPP Motion Works
Section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act allows a defendant to move, early in a proceeding, to have it dismissed where it arises from the defendant’s expression on a matter of public interest. The Legislature’s stated purposes are to encourage expression on matters of public interest, promote broad participation in public debate, discourage the use of litigation to unduly limit that expression, and reduce the risk that fear of legal action will hamper public participation.[2] A successful motion ends the action before the parties incur the cost of productions, discoveries, and trial.
The test has two stages. At the first, the defendant (the moving party) must show, on a balance of probabilities, that the proceeding arises from an expression it made and that the expression relates to a matter of public interest.[3] If it does, the burden shifts to the plaintiff (the responding party) under s. 137.1(4) to satisfy the court of both of the following:[4]
(a) there are grounds to believe that
(i) the proceeding has substantial merit, and
(ii) the moving party has no valid defence in the proceeding; and
(b) the harm likely to have been or to be suffered by the responding party as a result of the moving party’s expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression.[5]
If the plaintiff falls short on any part of that test, the action is dismissed.
Stage one: what counts as a matter of public interest
The statute does not define “matter of public interest.” The courts treat it as a broad concept that does not take into account the merits or manner of the expression, or the motive of its author.[6] In Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario v. Karahalios, the court described a matter of public interest as one “in which the public has some substantial concern beyond curiosity or prurient interest,” and one that “affects the welfare of citizens or concerns an issue of public controversy or concerns an issue about which citizens have a right to make fair comment.”[7] There is no qualitative assessment of the expression at this stage, and the burden is “purposefully not an onerous one.”[8] The public interest is not synonymous with what interests the public, but it is wide: in the Supreme Court’s words, “[t]he public has a genuine stake in knowing about many matters, ranging from science and the arts to the environment, religion, and morality.”[9]
Several principles recur in the case law:
- Expression can relate to a matter of public interest without engaging the interest of the entire community, or even a substantial part of it. It is enough that some segment of the community would have a genuine interest in the subject matter.[10]
- Public interest does not turn on the size of the audience. Communications on private matters can find very large audiences quickly, and statements between two people can relate to matters that have a strong public interest component.[11]
- Expression may relate to more than one matter. If one of those matters is a matter of public interest, the defendant has met its onus.[12]
- Comments about businesses will more obviously have a public dimension, because members of the public, or at least segments of the community, have an interest in knowing something about the companies that offer them services.[13]
- The provisions are not confined to defamation. A proceeding “arises from” expression where the expression grounds the claim, and nothing in s. 137.1 limits it to claims that fit the traditional notion of a SLAPP.[14] Courts have applied it to a claim for breach of a settlement agreement and to a negligence claim.[15]
Expression to a limited audience
Two appellate decisions show how these principles apply to expression that never reached the wider public.
In Mazhar v. Farooqi, the Court of Appeal upheld a finding that a confidential complaint to the board of a volunteer organization met the threshold, holding that “[t]he making of a complaint of harassment to those in charge of the environment in which it has allegedly occurred is a matter of public interest.”[16] At first instance, the motion judge had held that the complaint related to a matter of public interest, namely the character and integrity of a mentor in a volunteer organization, and that it was enough that some segment of the organization would have a genuine and legitimate interest in knowing about it. The motion judge found it significant that the organization was concerned about a potential breach of its Code of Conduct, and that its investigation went to the individual’s suitability to continue volunteering.[17]
In Bent v. Platnick, a personal injury lawyer emailed members of the Ontario Trial Lawyers Association about a doctor who allegedly altered medical experts’ reports prepared for insurers. The Supreme Court held that, in a broader sense, the email raised concerns about “the truthfulness, reliability, and integrity of medical reports filed on behalf of insurers in the arbitration process,” and in turn about “the integrity of the arbitration process itself and the proper administration of justice writ large.”[18] The email cleared the threshold. The case is also a reminder that stage one is only the beginning: a majority of the Court went on to hold that the doctor’s action should proceed.[19]
Rajic v. MacDonald: Background
Fr. Ljubomir Rajic, a Serbian Orthodox priest, swore an affidavit in March 2022 supporting one side of a family law proceeding. The other party, Rebecca MacDonald, then complained about him to the Serbian Orthodox Church’s ecclesiastical authorities in September 2022, and the church took disciplinary action against him.[20]
Fr. Rajic sued Ms. MacDonald for defamation, and she brought an anti-SLAPP motion. The motion judge dismissed it at the first stage, holding that she had not shown that her complaint “relate[d] to a matter of public interest.” She appealed.[21] The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge’s reasons disclosed legal errors, reviewable on a correctness standard, and focused on two of them.[22]
Error one: reading too much into Benchwood Builders
The motion judge relied on Benchwood Builders, Inc. v. Prescott, stating that the Court of Appeal had “put to rest” the consensus among lower courts about the “low public interest threshold.”[23] The Court of Appeal held that this misstated Benchwood. That decision addressed a narrower question: whether online consumer reviews of businesses or professionals should automatically be treated as relating to a matter of public interest. It did not raise the threshold under s. 137.1(3).[24] Because the motion judge had raised the bar above the standard set in Pointes Protection, he erred in law.[25]
Error two: focusing on the audience instead of the content
The motion judge repeatedly reasoned that the complaint could not be a matter of public interest because it never reached the public. He described it as a private grievance that never “entered the public market square of ideas and opinions.”[26] The Court of Appeal rejected that approach. The inquiry is contextual and asks what the expression is really about:
“The nature of the audience can be a relevant factor when conducting this contextual inquiry, but it is not determinative, since the subject-matter of expression made to even a very small number of people can nevertheless relate to a matter of public interest.”
Rajic, at para. 10[27]
The Court also relied on Mazhar and on Galati v. Toews, where a complaint to the Law Society of Ontario met the threshold because it went beyond the complainant’s private interest.[28]
What the complaint was really about
The Court accepted that Ms. MacDonald’s complaint stemmed partly from a private grievance. It also raised broader concerns: whether a priest should take sides as a witness in private litigation between church members instead of remaining neutral, whether he should have sought church permission first, and whether his conduct risked the church’s reputation and exposure to litigation. These were matters of genuine interest to the community of parishioners, whether or not she raised them with that community directly.[29]
The complaint also contained more serious personal allegations against Fr. Rajic, some of which Ms. MacDonald acknowledged were speculative. At this stage it does not matter whether the allegations were true or made in good faith, and nothing in the decision determines that any of them was true. Because they bore on his suitability to act as a priest, they arguably related to a matter of public interest as well, and in any event the complaint, read as a whole, cleared the threshold.[30]
The outcome: a rehearing, not a dismissal
The appeal was allowed, but Ms. MacDonald did not get the dismissal she asked for. The Court declined to conduct the s. 137.1(4) analysis itself as a court of first instance, without reasons and findings from below, and sent the motion back to be heard by a different Superior Court judge.[31] On costs, the Court reaffirmed that the enhanced costs regime in s. 137.1(7) does not apply on appeal. Ms. MacDonald received partial indemnity costs fixed at $30,000, all inclusive, with costs of the motion left to the judge who rehears it.[32]
What Happens at the Rehearing: Stage Two
With the threshold met, the burden now sits with Fr. Rajic. The Supreme Court has explained each element of s. 137.1(4):
- Grounds to believe. This requires a basis in the record and the law, taking into account the stage of the litigation: more than mere suspicion, but less than proof on a balance of probabilities.[33]
- Substantial merit. The claim must have a real prospect of success, meaning it is legally tenable and supported by evidence reasonably capable of belief. That requires more than an arguable case; a claim with merely some chance of success will not do.[34]
- No valid defence. The moving party puts in play the defences it intends to rely on, and the plaintiff must show grounds to believe those defences are not valid. If any defence is valid, the plaintiff has not met its burden and the claim should be dismissed.[35]
- The public interest weighing. The plaintiff must show the existence of harm and that the harm was suffered as a result of the defendant’s expression. It must then show, on a balance of probabilities, that the public interest in allowing the proceeding to continue outweighs the deleterious effects on expression and public participation. The Supreme Court described this weighing as the “crux or core” of the analysis.[36]
Key Takeaways
- Complaints to institutions are protected expression. A complaint to an employer, regulator, board, or religious body can relate to a matter of public interest even if it goes to only a few people, provided its subject matter reaches beyond a purely private dispute.
- Content drives the test, not distribution. Arguing that the defendant “never went public” will not carry a responding party at the threshold stage.
- The threshold remains low after Benchwood. Benchwood is about whether online reviews are automatically of public interest. It is not a general tightening of s. 137.1(3).
- Plaintiffs should build for stage two. For those suing over a complaint, the real contest will usually be under s. 137.1(4). As Bent shows, clearing the threshold does not end the case; the evidentiary record on merits, defences, and harm decides it.
- Expect a remittal, not an appellate ruling on the merits. Where a motion fails at the threshold, a successful appeal will likely send it back for a full hearing. That adds time and cost, and should be factored into strategy from the start.
One development to watch: the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal in Benchwood and heard the appeal in May 2026. Its decision may reshape how Ontario courts approach expression, including online reviews, at the public interest stage.[37]
Rajic is a helpful reminder that anti-SLAPP protection is not limited to public speech. Much of the expression that matters most to people’s reputations is made quietly, to those responsible for addressing it. The Court of Appeal has confirmed that this kind of expression may qualify for early protection, with the harder merits questions left for the second stage.
Need Advice About Defamation or an Anti-SLAPP Motion in Ontario?
Ruzbeh Hosseini assists clients with defamation disputes, including libel, slander, online defamation, and anti-SLAPP motions in Ontario. If you are considering a defamation claim, responding to one, or need advice about an anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, contact Ruzbeh Hosseini to discuss your options.
Frequently Asked Questions About Ontario Anti-SLAPP Defamation
Can a Private Complaint Qualify as a Matter of Public Interest Under Ontario’s Anti-SLAPP Law?
Yes. Rajic confirms that a complaint sent only to institutional decision-makers may still clear the first-stage public-interest threshold when its subject matter extends beyond a purely private dispute. Audience size can be relevant, but it is not determinative.
Does Clearing the Public-Interest Threshold Mean the Defamation Claim Is Dismissed?
No. Stage one only shifts the burden. The plaintiff may still keep the action alive by meeting the substantial-merit, no-valid-defence, and public-interest-weighing requirements under s. 137.1(4).
Are Anti-SLAPP Motions Limited to Defamation or Slander Claims?
No. As the article explains, s. 137.1 is not confined to defamation. The key question is whether the proceeding arises from expression relating to a matter of public interest; courts have applied the provision to other causes of action as well.
What Is the Practical Lesson from Rajic v. MacDonald?
A private distribution channel does not make expression private in subject matter. Parties should focus on what the expression concerns and, if stage one is met, prepare the evidentiary record for stage two.